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1  Introduction 
In this study we investigate whether the investment preferences of foreign bond portfolio 
investors, relative to the theoretical prescription, influence the host country’s cost of debt. 
Finance theory suggests that foreign portfolio investors should follow the benchmark country 
allocation prescribed by the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM). However, it 
is well established in the literature that barriers to international investments induce portfolio 
investors to ignore the normative prediction of the ICAPM and discriminate between 
countries by either under-weighting or over-weighting their investments relative to the 
prescribed optimal benchmark (see Cooper et al., 2012 for a review). With respect to foreign 
investments, such suboptimal allocation is known as foreign bias. Theory further notes that 
varying degrees of foreign biases should differentially affect market integration and thus 
international risk sharing (Stulz, 1999; Bekaert and Harvey, 2000).  
The theoretical framework relating sub-optimal foreign investments and cost of capital 
is well established (Lewis, 1999). It states that when markets are perfectly integrated and 
barriers to international investments are absent, a country’s expected return on a portfolio of 
tradeable assets is determined by the covariance between its return and that of the world 
market portfolio (Adler and Dumas, 1983). At the other extreme, for a severely segmented 
market, the expected return of a portfolio is a function of the covariance between the portfolio 
return and the local market return. Investors investing in a highly segmented local market 
require a higher return to compensate for the lower level of global risk sharing between 
domestic and foreign investors (for a mathematical derivation see Lau et al., 2010). When a 
market is partially integrated with the world market, the country’s expected return on a 
portfolio is determined by the weighted average of the covariance of the portfolio with the 
local market and the covariance of the portfolio with the world market, the weight being the 
level of market integration with the world market (Bekaert and Harvey, 1995). Consequently, 
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it follows that higher levels of foreign bias (i.e. over-allocation relative to benchmark) 
towards the domestic market should enhance global risk sharing (higher integration) of 
domestic assets, which in turn should lower the cost of capital (Stulz, 1999). However, 
empirical studies investigating the implications of suboptimal foreign allocations are scarce, 
and mainly limited to equity. To the best of our knowledge, no prior study examines the 
impact of suboptimal foreign investments (i.e. foreign bias) on the cost of debt. We address 
this gap by examining whether biases observed by foreign bond portfolio investors, compared 
to the theoretical prescription, have any implication for the host country’s cost of debt. 
Specifically, we argue that a higher level of foreign bond bias (relatively higher weighting 
against the prescribed weight) should result in lower cost of debt.  
Our study on the implication of foreign bias on cost debt is also motivated by the 
importance, development
1
 and characteristics
2
 of the bond market that are differenent from 
equity market. Comparatively, the size of global bond markets is roughly twice the size of 
equity market.
3
 The bond market has significantly grown in the past decade since debt 
financing has become one of the important sources of funding for governments, financial 
institutions and corporations. However, despite such substantial growth increases in cross-
border bond investments studies reveals that bond investors are sub-optimally diversifying 
                                               
1 The examination of debt is economically important due to the size of global bond markets which is nearly 
twice the size of equity markets with steady growth in the past decade. Data from the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) show that bond market size increased from USD 35.5 trillion in 2001 to USD 97.8 trillion in 
2013. During the corresponding period, cross-border holdings of long-term debt (excluding money market 
instruments) grew from USD 6.4 trillion to USD 24.2 trillion, as reported by International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
in Coordinated International Portfolio Survey (CPIS). 
2
 Myers and Majluf (1984) highlight the relative attractiveness of debt over equity to firms in their seminal 
study. Bonds also have unique characteristics relative to equity as asset class. For example, relative to equities, 
bonds exhibit lower volatility returns with a higher degree of relative safety.2 Studies also show that government 
bond returns are not influenced by the same factors that impact equity returns (Elton, 1999). Further, Campbell 
and Taksler (2003) document that the price of bonds significantly diverges from that of equities, suggesting that 
different factors could drive the attractiveness of equities and bonds asymmetrically. Further, there is evidence 
that investors do not avoid volatility in equity markets but do so from volatility in bond markets (Burger and 
Warnock, 2003).  
3 See McKinsey Global Institute (2011) for comparative size of equity and debt markets. 
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(Fidora et al., 2007). Our study provides implication of such sub-optimal diversification on 
the cost of debt. 
We test our research question using panel data sets from multiple sources reflecting 
suboptimal foreign bond allocations, and sovereign debt yield spread
4
 as a proxy of cost of 
debt. Specifically, we use the yield spread, over US Treasury bonds, of the comparable 
sovereign debt of emerging markets. We also use the sovereign bond yield spread, over 
similar German bonds, for Eurozone (economic and monetary union (EMU)) countries as a 
measure of cost of debt for developed European markets. Consistent with theory, we find that 
the cost of debt across our sample countries is strongly and negatively related to foreign bond 
portfolio investors’ foreign bias. Our results provide evidence that varying degrees of foreign 
bias have significant implications for the cost of debt in a host country. 
This key result remains qualitatively unchanged when we address the issue of 
endogeneity using different robustness tests, including vector auto-regressive models and 
instrumental variables. Our results are also consistent when we use data from different 
sources such as JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Indices (EMBI) series, Thomson Reuters, 
Coordinated International Portfolio Survey (CPIS) and EPFR Global Inc. Further, the recent 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis offers an ideal experimental set-up to observe whether any 
difference in foreign bias observed between the group comprising the five most affected 
countries (i.e. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, hereafter referred to as GIIPS) and 
the group constituting five relatively less affected Eurozone countries differentially impacts 
the cost of debt.  
                                               
4 Borensztein et al. (2013) show that sovereign ratings represent a strong upper bound assigned to corporate 
bonds. They conclude that sovereign risk is a significant factor in the pricing of corporate debt. 
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Our study contributes to two different strands of the finance literature. First, we add to 
the limited but growing literature that investigates the implications of suboptimal 
international allocations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study which 
investigates the link between the theoretically inconsistent phenomenon of foreign bias and 
cost of debt. This study has similarities to that of Lau et al. (2010) who examine the effect of 
suboptimal international equity allocations on cost of equity capital; however, we differ in a 
number of important areas. The cost of equity is only one part of the overall cost of capital 
and it is important to understand whether foreign bond holders’ deviation from the 
theoretically prescribed benchmark affects the cost of debt. Also, rather than investigating 
how home investors’ suboptimal investments in their home market affect cost of debt, we 
examine how foreign investors’ theoretically biased investment decisions influence the cost 
of debt.
5
 Finally, we also apply a more
 
rigorous research approach by addressing the 
possibility of endogeneity using country fixed effects, vector auto regression, instrumental 
variable estimation and by exploiting a quasi-natural experimental set-up.
6
  
Second, our study also adds to the finance literature investigating the determinants of 
sovereign bond spreads, i.e. credit risk (Longstaff et al., 2011; Cruces and Trebesch, 2013; 
Bekaert et al., 2014). Our paper differs from these studies by considering the idea that 
suboptimal foreign bond allocation (i.e. foreign bias) is also related to the cost of sovereign 
debt. A number of existing studies also explore the relation between foreign bond 
investments and spreads.
7
 Our study is conceptually different from this strand of work as we 
                                               
5
 Sub-optimal investments in domestic market is referred to as home bias, which relates to the  phenomenon in 
which local investors over-weight their domestic market relative to the prescribed theoretical benchmark, 
thereby leaving significantly lower share of the country’s wealth to be held by foreign investors. The presence 
of foreign bias indicates that foreign investors either overweight or underweight foreign markets relative to the 
benchmark. However, Cooper et al. (2012) show that home and foreign biases are inversely related.  
6 Lau et al. (2010) use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and the Fama-Macbeth approach. 
7 See Peiris (2010), Andritzky (2012), Jaramillo and Zhang (2013), and Arslanalp and Poghosyan (2014).   
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focus on the role of theoretically inconsistent foreign bias phenomena rather than the absolute 
value of foreign holdings. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data used in this 
study. Section 3 discusses the empirical results and robustness checks, and section 4 offers 
some concluding remarks. 
2  Data 
First, we describe the two sources of data that we use to obtain the sovereign debt yield 
spreads (our proxy for cost of debt). Second, we explain the construction of foreign bias 
measure reflecting the cross-country allocation preferences of foreign bond portfolio 
investors relative to that prescribed by finance theory (Chan et al., 2005; Cooper et al., 2012). 
Finally, we briefly describe the control variables we use in our analyses. In this study we use 
quarterly frequency and annual frequency data. These choices are constrained by the 
availability of data on the benchmark portfolio as discussed below. 
2.1 Sovereign bond spreads – cost of debt 
The varying characteristics of bonds as asset class complicate the comparability of cross-
country cost of debt. Thus, we focus mainly on the yield spreads of long-term dollar 
denominated sovereign bonds issued by emerging markets because the availability of this 
data set allows for a meaningful comparison across countries.
8
 These spreads are the yield to 
maturity (YTM) of emerging market sovereign bonds in excess of the YTM of US Treasuries 
with comparable maturities. As an additional test to extend our examination to more 
                                               
8 Sovereign yields also proxy the cost of cross-country corporate debt, given the strong evidence that corporate 
spreads are generally positively correlated with sovereign spreads (Durbin and Ng, 2005). Further, as noted 
earlier, Borensztein et al. (2013) suggest that sovereign rating represents a strong upper bound rating assigned to 
corporates. They empirically show that sovereign risk is a significant factor in the pricing of corporate debt. 
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developed markets, we include ten EMU members. The choice of these countries is dictated 
by the availability of comparable bond data.  
Sovereign bond yield spreads (SPRD) are obtained from two different sources. First, 
the emerging market spreads are from the EMBI database on a quarterly basis (from 2002 to 
2014). The EMBI data set includes EMBI Plus (EMBIP) and EMBI Global (EMBIG). 
EMBIP is available for a smaller number of emerging countries (17 countries as at December 
2014) and consists of bonds which meet strict criteria in terms of comparable liquidity, size, 
currency, maturity and other characteristics. One of the advantages of using EMBI data is the 
availability of “stripped spreads” which is the excess basis points (bps) over US Treasuries of 
similar maturity and net of a collateralized portion of payments on such bonds (which are 
mostly Brady bonds). EMBIG incorporates less liquid instruments than EMBIP, but is 
available for a wider number of countries (60 as at December 2014). For most of our analyses 
we use SPRD from the EMBIG database. However, we also use SPRD from EMBIP as an 
additional robustness test in Section 3.7 to address concerns related to country-specific bond 
market liquidity (the EMBI data set is also used by a number of papers including Cruces and 
Trebesch, 2013 and Bekaert et al., 2014). 
For EMU countries, we source the benchmark 10-year government bond index from 
Thompson Reuters on a quarterly basis and compute the yield spread over the benchmark 
German Bund, a practice consistent with existing studies (Ebner, 2009; Favero et al., 2010). 
These YTMs on Euro-denominated bonds are available for 11 EMU countries only.
9
 The 
average maturity for the constituent bonds in these indices is close to 10 years for all 
countries (including Germany).  
                                               
9 GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and non-GIIPS (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands). 
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2.2  Independent variable – foreign bias 
As noted in the literature (Chan et al., 2005; Cooper et al., 2012), for a foreign investor 
domiciled in country i investing in bonds of host country j at time t, the deviation from 
optimal ICAPM allocations for the entire host market can be shown by equation (1):  
 
                      
      (1) 
 
where          denotes foreign bias exhibited from investors in country (i) towards bonds of 
host country (j) for time period t (quarter-end in the case of EPFR Global and year-end in the 
case of CPIS data).
10
      is the weight of bond holdings of host country (j) in the portfolio of 
investors from country (i) and    
  is the share of country (j) in the world bond market, used 
as the ICAPM benchmark.   
We use data from two different sources to construct measures of      for emerging and 
EMU host markets. For emerging markets (which is our main data set), data are from EPFR 
Global, which provides monthly bond allocations (from 2002 to 2014) of funds that have  a 
strategic focus of investing across emerging markets.
11
 As of December 2014, this database 
includes 78 funds with a combined fund size of USD 80.6 billion allocated across emerging 
                                               
10 
As we are interested in the overall foreign bias in a given country, the measures we have constructed takes 
into account funds’ investment in the whole of the bond market in that emerging market including corporate 
bonds, municipal bonds, sovereign bonds etc. The implied assumption is that this measure is very close to the 
actual aggregate market level investments, theoretically needed to construct foreign bond bias measure for a 
country. Limiting the allocation to only a selection of bonds (e.g. only sovereign or high yield) would be very 
restrictive and not consistent with the theoretical argument of market level foreign bias puzzle ( Fidora et al., 
2007; De Moor and Vanpée, 2013).  
11 The full database as at December 2014 additionally contains 56 international funds focusing globally, five 
funds focusing on Latin America, 70 focusing on Europe (available only for 2014), two focusing on Emerging 
Europe, and 20 focusing on Asia, except Japan. We only include emerging market funds as our main data for 
bond spreads covers emerging markets only. 
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markets. These funds are domiciled in eight developed markets
12
 and       is the share of 
each fund’s allocation domiciled in country i for the host country j for the period t. Given the 
fact that our benchmark allocation measures, discussed below, are only available at quarterly 
frequency, we take the funds’ quarter-end allocations instead of month-end allocations. For 
EMU host markets, we compute the foreign allocations to these countries using the yearly 
foreign holdings data provided in CPIS.
13
 
Next, the benchmark weight of country   in the world bond market is calculated as 
shown in equation (2): 
 
   
          
 
   
   (2) 
 
where    
  is the share of country   in the world bond market and     is the bond market 
outstanding of country   at the end of period t as obtained from BIS.14 When calculating 
benchmark weights for emerging markets, n in equation (2) equals 50 since the EPFR funds’ 
allocations are strategically focussed across the 50 most investable emerging markets in our 
dataset and are specifically known as emerging markets’ global funds. However, in the case 
of EMU markets, n includes the entire number of countries in the world for which bond 
market outstanding data are available on BIS (i.e. 110 countries). This is because bond 
                                               
12 Canada (1), Denmark (2), Germany (1), Ireland (9), Japan (1), Luxembourg (30), United Kingdom (6), and 
United States (28). 
13 A few caveats need to be noted in using the CPIS data set. For example, investment from some countries, 
(notably China) are not reported; some investments are shown as negative values; a small sample is reported as 
unallocated; some data are reported as confidential and investments from ‘international organizations’ are also 
reported. We ignore the negative and unallocated cross-border investments. Following Cooper et al. (2012) we 
replace all zero international investment as USD 1 to ensure that complete underinvestment in host markets are 
not ignored. 
14 This is consistent with Fidora et al. (2007). An alternative option would be to use country weights from 
indices such as MSCI or JP Morgan bond indices. This is not desirable in our study because funds are known to 
closely follow such indices while making country-wise allocations (Raddatz et al., 2014). Our interest is in 
finding out how the deviation of foreign allocation, vis-a-vis a country’s share in world market capitalization, 
impacts on spread. Using such bond indices (that are tracked by funds) as a benchmark defeats this purpose. 
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allocation to EMU host markets is computed from CPIS which provides cross-border bond 
holdings across the world. Theoretically, this does not affect the construction and use of 
benchmark portfolio. 
For each period t (again quarter-end in the case of using EPFR Global and year-end in 
the case of CPIS data), we take the average foreign bias (        ) that is computed by 
taking the average across all source country investors (i=1…..k) towards the host country j 
for each period t as shown below: 
 
 
         
         
 
   
 
         (3) 
 
2.3  Control variables 
One important characteristic of sovereign bonds that constitute the EMBI series is that time 
remaining to maturity is different in each country index. This can influence variations in the 
spreads. Following Bekaert et al. (2014), we control for this disparity by including average 
remaining years to maturity (LIFE)  in our model. LIFE, as reported by JP Morgan and used 
in our analyses in natural log form, is expected to be positively associated with bond spread. 
Spreads in sovereign debts can be a function of country-specific macroeconomic 
factors such as level of indebtedness, foreign exchange reserves, debt service burden etc. 
(Boehmer and Megginson, 1990). However, more recent evidence (Longstaff et al., 2011; 
Afonso et al., 2015) highlights the importance of global economic factors as the driving force 
behind sovereign spreads. Accordingly, we include both global macroeconomic factors and 
country-specific macroeconomic conditions as additional control variables.  
For a measure of global macroeconomic factors (GBL), we follow Cruces and 
Trebesch (2013) and Bekaert et al. (2014) and take the yield spread between Barclays US 
Corporate High Yield and Barclays US Treasury bonds (sourced from Thomson Reuters). 
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GBL is used in its natural logarithmic form and we anticipate it will have a positive 
association with bond yield spread. To capture various aspects of country-specific 
macroeconomic conditions, we use data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
on economic risk, financial risk, and political risk ratings (provided by The PRS Group). For 
economic and financial risks, the ICRG provides measures of each of these risks as an 
aggregate of five different components at country level on a scale of 0–50 with higher scores 
denoting lower potential risk.
15
 Following Bekaert et al. (2014), we aggregate the economic 
and financial risk scores for each country and subtract them from 100 to equate higher score 
to higher potential risk (EFRisk).  
We also control for country-specific political risk drivers by including the composite 
political index of the ICRG, consisting of 12 different risk factors,
16
 measured on a scale of 0-
100 with a higher score implying lower potential political risk. We similarly subtract each 
country’s score from 100 to obtain our measure of political risk (PRisk). Both EFRisk and 
PRisk are used in natural log form of each country, less that of the US rating, and are 
expected to have a positive association with bond spreads. 
Liquidity is also clearly an important element in security value (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986). The use of EFRisk captures variations in cross-country liquidity to a 
certain extent. For example, one of the sub-components of EFRisk is foreign debt scaled by 
GDP which itself reflects the depth and breadth of the foreign bond market relative to the size 
of the economy. To address any remaining concerns related to country-specific bond market 
                                               
15 ICRG Economic risks include i) GDP per capita, ii) real GDP growth, iii) annual inflation, iv) budget balance 
to GDP ratio, and v) current account to GDP ratio. ICRG Financial risks include i) foreign debt to GDP, ii) 
foreign debt service to exports, iii) current account to exports, iv) international reserve as months of import 
cover, and v) exchange rate stability. See http://www.prsgroup.com for further details. 
16 ICRG Political risks include i) government stability, ii) socioeconomic conditions, iii) investment profile, iv) 
internal conflict, v) external conflict, vi) corruption, vii) military in politics, viii) religious tensions, ix) law and 
order, x) ethnic tensions, xi) democratic accountability, and xii) bureaucracy quality. 
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liquidity, we use the yield spread from EMBIP, which includes highly comparable bonds 
with respect to liquidity than that of EMBIG (see additional robustness test in section 3.7). In 
the case of regression using EPFR data, all the controls are at a quarterly frequency (averaged 
over three months); and for CPIS data, the controls are at an annual frequency (averaged over 
12 months). 
3  Empirical analysis 
We begin our empirical analysis by briefly explaining the summary figures of the key 
variables. Thereafter, we discuss the results of basic regression estimations followed by 
robustness tests. 
3.1  Summary statistics and correlation  
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of all key variables. SPRD in column I is the yield 
spread over US Treasury bonds (from EMBIG) available for the 50 emerging markets’ 
sovereign bonds that have the most active bond markets. There are wide variations across 
countries with respect to their spreads. For example, Ivory Coast, Argentina, Ecuador, 
Venezuela and Belarus are the top five countries with highest level of spreads and China, 
Chile, Malaysia, Poland and Slovakia have the lowest spreads.  
To show the temporal variation in SPRD, we provide additional data in Appendix A 
with the average SPRD during four sub-periods within our sample. Appendix A shows that 
countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, 
Uruguay etc. have witnessed a decline in their spreads during the sample period. On the other 
hand, Egypt, Hungary, Ukraine, Venezuela etc. have witnessed increasing spreads during this 
period.  
Column II (of Table 1) shows the          measure for host countries. Some 
countries that exhibit low average yield spreads also have relatively low levels of foreign bias 
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(see Slovakia and China). In contrast, Belarus, Ivory Coast, Ukraine, Venezuela etc. have 
high levels of average yield spreads and high levels of foreign bias. Apart from indicating 
possible panel effects, this suggests that other important country-specific factors could also 
play important roles in explaining the varying degrees of yield spread observed across the 
cross-section of countries and thus the importance of incorporating controls. 
 
[….Insert Table 1 here….] 
 
Time remaining to maturity (LIFE) for the constituent bonds of EMBIG country 
indices is shown in Column III in Table 1. The average LIFE is 9.8 years indicating the long 
term nature of the constituent bonds in EMBI. Argentina, El Salvador, Jamaica, Peru, and 
Uruguay, have an average LIFE of 15 years or more, but Belarus (3.8 years), Morocco (4.1), 
Pakistan (4.9), and Ukraine (4.9) are among the countries with the lowest LIFE implying a 
relatively short period of time remaining to pay off their debts. Over time, the underlying 
trend (not shown for brevity) reveals a gradual decrease in LIFE – as would be expected. 
However, it also shows sharp and sudden increases for most countries, presumably due to the 
issuance of more long-term debts.   
The ICRG risk ratings in columns IV, V and VI in Table 1 show quarterly average 
Economic Risk (ER), Financial Risk (FR) and Political Risk (PR) ratings of the respective 
countries, as reported by the ICRG, with a higher score denoting lower risk. There are some 
significant variations between emerging market countries. The between variations (and 
within variations) in ER, FR, and PR ratings are 3.1 (2.9), 4.5 (2.8), and 8.9 (2.8) standard 
deviations respectively (relative to their average ratings). For example, in terms of individual 
countries, Jamaica and Lebanon have the lowest ER ratings (i.e. highest economic risk). 
Belarus and Latvia are the countries with lowest FR measures (higher financial risk). Finally, 
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in terms of the PR scores, Iraq, Nigeria, and Pakistan are among the countries with highest 
level of political risk (i.e. low PR score). 
The correlation matrix for all the key variables is presented in Table 2. The correlation 
between variables are generally in the expected direction. SPRD is negatively correlated with 
ER, FR and PR with statistical significance at conventional levels (5% level). SPRD is also 
negatively correlated with FBIAS.
17
 These pairwise correlations provide some evidence on 
the direction of association and in the next section we use regression analysis to establish 
credible relations. 
3.2 Regression analysis 
The general regression specification for assessing the impact of foreign bias on sovereign 
bond spread (        is shown in equation (4): 
 
                                                                (4) 
 
where          is the average foreign bias registered across all funds (i) towards the host 
country (j) at time t;        is the time remaining to maturity of the constituent bonds; 
        is the vector of control variables specific to host country (j), and         is the global 
macroeconomic control.    is the vector of time dummies and    are host country dummies. 
Our sample exhibits a substantial level of cross-sectional dependence.
18
 To address the spatial 
dependence (except when stated specifically), we report results with standard errors corrected 
for within-country heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence.  
                                               
17 The total number of observation is 784 due to the unavailability of SPRD (EMBI Plus) for some countries. 
18 Due to the possible presence of common shocks and unobserved variables in the disturbance terms, panel data 
models are likely to possess elements of spatial dependence, especially when time period lengthens. The 
absolute correlation of error terms between countries is 0.5 on average for the emerging markets sample. 
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The results of different specifications of the general Equation (4) are shown in Table 
3. Across models I – VI, the foreign bias (AFBIAS) coefficients have the expected signs and 
are statistically significant at the 1% level.
19
 Assuming exogeneity,
20
 an interpretation of the 
coefficient of AFBIAS in column VI suggests that an increase in AFBIAS measure by one unit 
reduces bond spread by 64 bps. For illustrative purposes, if a country with a median value of 
AFBIAS measure (1.32) could improve its position to 75 percentile (2.25), its bond yield 
spread would drop by approximately 60 bps [(2.25-1.32) x 64bps]. These results strongly 
indicate that markets which are successful in attracting higher foreign bond allocations 
relative to the benchmark are associated with lower cost of debt.  
 
[….Insert Table 3 here….] 
 
In terms of the control variables, time remaining to maturity (LIFE) has an unexpected 
negative sign, but is not statistically significant across the models. The introduction of the 
global macroeconomic variable (GBL) in Column III produces no material change to our key 
variable (AFBIAS).
21
 As expected, the GBL is positively related to SPRD and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This signifies that global macroeconomic shocks adversely affect 
the cost of debt. The EFRisk factor also enters the regression with the expected sign and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that country economic factors also play 
                                               
19 Hausman’s specification test justifies the use of fixed effects. 
20 We address the issue of endogeneity in section 3. However, as with any empirical work using non-
experimental data, caution should be exercised when evaluating economic significance as it is extremely 
challenging to fully mitigate the issue of endogeneity. Further, these results are limited to the sample period and 
data set we use in this study. Despite the obvious limitations of any observational study, we believe the results 
provide a strong indication of the association as predicted by the theory. 
21 As an alternative, we replace GBL by the option-implied volatility on the S&P 500 index (VIX) which serves 
as a proxy for global risk aversion. The use of VIX leads to no material change in our main results. Note that 
GBL is dropped in column VI due to the introduction of time fixed effects as the latter capture aggregate 
fluctuations. 
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an important role in explaining the yield spread. Similarly, we find that political risk (PRisk) 
is significant in determining country yield spread. These results are generally consistent with 
the evidence reported in the current literature (Bekaert et al., 2014). The significance of 
AFBIAS remains unaltered across all specifications in models I to VI. Further, excluding 
those countries with less active representation in EMBI does not alter the overall results: 
when we take into account only those 24 countries for which SPRD is available for the entire 
50 quarters in our sample, results (available on request) remain essentially the same; results 
still remain qualitatively similar when only those 37 host countries with SPRD available for 
at least 25 continuous quarters are considered. Overall, these results support the negative 
association of foreign bond bias with sovereign spreads, consistent with the prediction of 
ICAPM. 
3.3 Robustness checks - endogeneity 
In this section we outline how we deal with some of the problems in our general econometric 
modelling, specified in equation (4). Though finance theory, as discussed earlier, leads us to 
conjecture that sovereign bond spread could be a function of foreign bias, there might be 
other alternative explanatory factors that could influence bond yield spread. However, 
provided that such country-specific factors and unobserved factors remain  stable over time, 
the panel data set in our modelling with the inclusion of country fixed effects (Bhattacharya 
et al., 2003), and more importantly the use of ICRG risk ratings, mitigates the concern of 
omitted variables to a certain extent (Bekaert et al., 2014). However, our estimates could still 
be questioned over concerns related to reverse causality. It could be the case that the fall in 
the country spreads itself motivates investors to invest more. Although it is challenging to 
fully address the concern of endogeneity in observational studies, we undertake additional 
robustness tests to mitigate the concern as far as possible. 
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First, following Carrieri et al. (2013), we replace AFBIAS by its single-period lagged 
values AFBIAS (lag 1) as a predetermined variable addressing the potential concern of 
reverse causality. As shown in Table 4, the results for AFBIAS (lag 1) are consistent with our 
earlier findings. 
[….Insert Table 4 here….] 
 
Second, following Gelos and Wei (2005), we estimate a vector autoregresssion (VAR) 
model. We assume SPRD and AFBIAS to be endogenously determined variables and all 
control variables to be exogenous variables. The endogenous variables are modelled as a 
linear function of one period lagged values of all endogenous variables plus the contemporary 
values of all exogenous variables as shown in equation (5) and (6):
22
 
 
                                                                              (5) 
 
                                                                               (6) 
 
Results from the VAR model are presented in Table 5 (using the EMBIG sample). We 
find that AFBIAS Granger-causes SPRD (Columns I and II) although the coefficients are 
smaller in magnitude as compared to our earlier results.
23
 However, we do not find that SPRD 
Granger-causes AFBIAS.  
[….Insert Table 5 here….] 
 
                                               
22 Gelos and Wei (2005) and Statman et al. (2006) amongst others use VAR models to examine endogeneity. 
23 This is expected as the model specification has completely alternated to address the endogeneity issue. 
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We further use the two-stage least square (2SLS) technique using an instrumental 
variable for AFBIAS. Empirical evidence shows that investors tend to invest more in familiar 
assets, ignoring optimal asset allocation to some extent (Huberman, 2001). We represent 
familiarity by the first principal component of three variables: mobile usage per 100; 
broadband usage per 100; and telephone usage per 100. For all the host countries, these three 
variables are sourced from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. The 
intuition is that having higher usage of digital information and communication would lead to 
higher informational linkage, thus enhancing familiarity of the host markets ( Portes et al., 
2001; Forbes, 2010, amongst others). Based on this familiarity literature, we argue that 
having higher scores on these aspects makes a country more familiar to the rest of the world, 
encouraging more foreign bias. Results from the 2SLS regression, presented in Table 6, show 
that AFBIAS is still negatively significant, consistent with our overall results.
24
 
 
[….Insert Table 6 here….] 
 
As a final step to address endogeneity, we undertake a shock-based natural experiment 
exploiting the recent Euro debt crisis as an exogenous shock. Given the nature of shock 
affecting Eurozone countries (see sections 3.5 and 3.6), we conduct this experiment only for 
EMU markets. The experiment and results are discussed in section 3.6. 
3.4 Alternative data source – CPIS 
We use alternative cross-border holdings of long-term debt data from CPIS to obtain a 
measure of foreign bias for global markets. As of December 2014, CPIS provides cross-
                                               
24 The Sargan test does not reject the null of correlation between the instrument and the error term with a p-
value of 0.35. 
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border bond holdings from 80 source countries into roughly 240 host countries. The country 
benchmark from BIS is available on a quarterly basis, but bond holding figures from CPIS 
are available only on an annual basis.
25
 Therefore we have to construct the CPIS-based 
AFBIAS measure annually for this alternative test.  
We repeat our baseline regression (specification 4) with the measure of AFBIAS 
constructed using data from CPIS. The results (not shown for brevity but available on 
request) support our key finding that AFBIAS is negatively related with SPRD.
 26
  
3.5 Spread and foreign bias using developed market data (EMU markets) 
AFBIAS constructed from CPIS also allows us to extend empirical analysis to developed 
markets. As EMBIG/EMBIP data are available only for emerging markets, we use the YTM 
of euro-denominated debt available for 11 EMU countries including Germany. Using 
Germany as the yardstick, we calculate the spread (SPRD_EMU) for the 10 remaining EMU 
countries by subtracting the YTM of Germany from that of the respective countries (Ebner, 
2009). By using just the euro-denominated bonds for the YTM, we are able to exploit a 
relatively cleaner measure of spread devoid of exchange rate volatility and inflation. 
Focusing just on the EMU market also carries additional benefit by allowing us to conduct a 
quasi-natural experiment, as discussed in section 3.3. We re-run specification (4) by using 
SPRD_EMU and AFBIAS for 10 EMU members only (excluding Germany). As such, both 
EFRisk and PRisk scores are taken as the differences from those of Germany (instead of the 
US).  
[….Insert Table 7 here….] 
 
                                               
25 CPIS data are available on a half-yearly basis from 2013 onwards. 
26 We correct standard errors using the Newey-West method.  
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The results presented in Table 7 are consistent with our main results. A strict 
interpretation of Model VI suggests that a unit increase in AFBIAS measure is associated with 
a reduction of 378 bps in SPRD_EMU. This is high compared to our earlier results. This 
could possibly be attributed to significant movement in AFBIAS and SPRD_EMU measures 
in different directions, especially for GIIPS countries after the Eurozone debt crisis, as can be 
seen in Figure 1 and 2. These two figures show that the GIIPS countries experienced a 
dramatic increase in their spread compared to non-GIIPS euro countries. This is also 
accompanied by a significant drop in the measure of foreign bias for GIIPS countries. The 
average 378 bps coefficient is thus capturing the covariation between AFBIAS and 
SPRD_EMU. 
[….Insert Figure 1 and 2 here….] 
 
We note in passing that the SPRD_EMU of EMU countries in our sample is strongly 
linked to economic and financial risk (EFRisk) but less so to global factors (GBL) and 
political risk (PRisk). We run further robustness tests for these results for EMU markets by 
replacing AFBIAS by its lagged value by one period in specification (4) and also by running a 
VAR model as shown in specifications (5) and (6). The results are not shown for brevity (but 
are available from the authors on request) are consistent with our key findings.  
3.6 Difference in differences (DID) analysis 
Reporting interesting developments in the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, Acharya et al. 
(2016) note that the stress-test held in 2010 of 91 European banks reveals evidence of 
significant home bias, i.e. lower foreign bias, in that local banks held a substantial portion of 
their own government bonds. Such suboptimal investments were highest for countries with 
greatest risk of government debt default, i.e. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
(GIIPS). Thus, the Eurozone debt crisis provides an excellent set-up to conduct a quasi-
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natural experiment using the DID technique to investigate whether the exogenous shock, 
which triggered changes in foreign bias, had any impact on cost of debt. We choose 2009 as 
the start of the Eurozone debt crisis due to the fact that the global financial crisis had already 
peaked and started to transform into sovereign debt crisis in the EMU countries by mid-2009 
(Afonso et al., 2015). We treat the Eurozone crisis as an exogenous shock that impacted on 
the AFBIAS of two different sets of EMU countries in different ways. As evident from Figure 
2, the GIIPS countries were more severely affected by the crisis and witnessed a significant 
drop in AFBIAS measures after the start of the crisis whereas the AFBIAS of the other five 
EMU countries (control countries) in our sample remained relatively steady, even after the 
onset of the crisis (see Figure 2). Following theoretical prediction, this decline (change) in the 
AFBIAS trend of GIIPS should lead to higher spread for GIIPS after controlling for any other 
factors that might affect SPRD_EMU. To put this argument to the test, we run the regression 
as shown in specification ((7): 
 
                                                                          
                 
(
(7) 
 
where Giips is a dummy variable equalling one for GIIPS, also known as “treated” (0 
otherwise), and Post is a dummy equal to one for time periods starting from 2009 (0 
otherwise). If the exogenous shock in the form of crisis subdued the AFBIAS measures in the 
most affected countries (i.e. GIIPS), it would lead to higher SPRD_EMU in such treated 
countries relative to the “control” countries. In equation ((7), since Giips is the treatment, we 
expect    to be positive to indicate that SPRD_EMU increased relatively more for the GIIPS 
countries’ debt as a result of the exogenous shock that reduced the AFBIAS measure.  
[….Insert Table 8 here….] 
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Results from specification ((7) are presented in Table 8. As expected, the coefficient for 
the DID effect                ) is positive and statistically significant even after 
controlling for a range of country-specific and global variables that might affect SPRD_EMU. 
Our results provide support to the notion that the decline in AFBIAS, due to the Eurozone 
crisis, led to an increase in bond spread for GIIPS countries more than for the control 
countries. In quantitative terms, we find that the DID effect is roughly 433 bps for the GIIPS 
countries, reflecting the severity of the effect of the crisis on these countries’ bond spreads. 
3.7 Country-specific liquidity effects 
Finally, we consider the effect of market-specific liquidity in our basic regression model by 
replacing the EMBIG spread in our baseline regression by spread from the EMBIP series, 
which is composed of homogeneously more liquid bonds. Results (not shown but available 
from the authors on request) show that the overall finding in this step-wise regression is 
consistent with our results in Table 3. Due to the availability of EMBIP across a narrower set 
of countries, the number of observation decreases substantially (compared to Table 3). The 
influence of AFBIAS on SPRD is in the expected direction and similar to our main result but 
the degree of impact is much more pronounced in comparison to Table 3. 
We also test the spreads from EMBIP with the same robustness tests, as discussed in 
Section 3.3. These results show that our key findings remain essentially the same (not shown 
for brevity, but available from the authors on request). These findings alleviate any concerns 
that may arise due to the difference in bond market liquidity among our sample countries. 
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3.8 Other robustness tests 27 
We note that periods of sovereign defaults can also have a substantial impact on the 
spreads of defaulting countries. Recent evidence shows that the intensity of default and 
associated cost to investors, rather than just default per se, impacts on the cost of capital for 
emerging market governments (Cruces and Trebesch, 2013). In our sample, six countries 
have defaulted during the sample (for a total of eight times).
28
 Therefore we include a dummy 
variable for periods of default as a control variable in equation (4). This does not lead to any 
significant change in our main results in Table 3 (the results are available from the authors on 
request).  
So far, we have used data from ICRG for EFRisk and PRisk in our analysis. We now 
use alternative dataset to capture economic and political risk. We take GDP per capita growth 
(annual %) as a measure of economic risk from World Bank Development Indicators and 
subtract the measures from corresponding US figures for that year to get a measure of 
difference in growth of GDP per capita (GDPph). We replace political risk by governance 
index constructed as the aggregate of six different risks, namely i) Control of Corruption, ii) 
Government Effectiveness, iii) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, iv) 
Regulatory Quality, v) Rule of Law, and vi) Voice and Accountability taken from World 
Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI). All these measures are provided on a scale of 
(approximately) -2.5 to +2.5 with higher score denoting more favourable measure. These 
aggregate figures are then subtracted from the US aggregate figure for the year to get our 
measure of governance index (Gov Indx) for a country for a given year. We replace EFRisk 
                                               
27 We thank anonymous referees for these suggestions. 
28 Defaulting countries are Argentina (once in 2005), Dominican Republic (twice in 2005), Ecuador (once in 
2009), Ivory Coast (2010 and 2012), Iraq (2006) and Uruguay (once in 2003). Data are from Cruces and 
Trebesch (2013) with the updated file available at https://sites.google.com/site/christophtrebesch/data  
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and PRisk by GDPph and Gov Indx in our baseline regression of specification (4 ) and 
provide the results in Table 9.  
 In column I, GDPph enters the regression in the expected direction with statistical 
significance denoting that the lower the GDPPh is for a country compared to USA, the higher 
the SPRD tends to be. Gov Indx in column II also exhibits statistically significant impact in 
the expected direction. Introduction of time dummies in column III does not lead to any 
material change in the overall results. In column IV, we re-introduce EFRisk and PRisk along 
with the GDPph and WBGI variable. The results yield insignificant GDPph,
29
 however the 
variable of interest AFBIAS is consistent with earlier findings.   
Further, as mentioned in Section 2.2, most of the funds used in our data for emerging 
markets are domiciled in USA and Luxembourg; thus our measure of AFBIAS and the results 
so far could be influenced by the strategies adopted by the funds domiciled in these two 
countries. To mitigate this concern, we recalculate measure of AFBIAS by excluding all the 
funds domiciled in USA and Luxembourg and re-run (specification 4). The results (available 
on request) remain essentially the same. 
For EMU countries, we further use data from CPIS and BIS to construct home bias 
measure in line with Chan et al. (2005). Home bias is expected to be positively associated 
with cost of capital (Adler and Dumas, 1983; Lau et al., 2010; Lewis, 1999). Untabulated 
results (available on request) support this notion and show that home bias (for the 10 EMU 
countries in our sample) is economically and statistically associated with cost of debt. 
However, when we use home bias measure for emerging markets to conduct a similar test, we 
do not find statistically significant results. This is because the home bias measure constructed 
                                               
29 One possible reason is because EFRisk also captures the potential macro-economic and financial risks and 
hence the effect of GDPph is captured in this measure. 
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using CPIS data is possibly noisier for emerging markets than developed markets. 
Specifically, CPIS provides data for cross-border holdings only; and domestic bond holdings 
by domestic investors – which is needed to construct the measure of home bias – have to be 
derived using the cross-border allocation figures.
30
 This introduces noise at various levels. 
This phenomenon is arguably less severe in case of developed markets (and the EMU 
markets in our sample) who may have a better reporting standards, more uniform approach in 
reporting investment figures to IMF, and have a better chance of their debt instruments 
(owned by non-residents) being reported correctly in CPIS owing to their relatively better-
developed bond markets.  
4 Conclusion 
It is well recognized in the finance literature that barriers to international investments compel 
portfolio investors to deviate from the normative prediction of optimal allocation in a foreign 
country (known as foreign bias). Theory further notes that varying degrees of foreign biases 
differentially affect the degree of market integration and thus international risk sharing. This 
suggests that higher levels of foreign bias (i.e. over-allocation relative to benchmark) towards 
a host market should boost global risk sharing, which should further lead to a lower cost of 
capital. However, studies examining the implications of such suboptimal allocations are 
scarce and focus mainly on equity investments. This paucity of studies in the literature, along 
with room for methodological improvements, motivates us to examine whether foreign biases 
                                               
30 It is mandatory for participating countries to report their foreign holdings (assets issued by non-residents but 
held by domestic residents) in long-term bonds and equities separately, while reporting of liabilities held by 
domestic investors is optional. It is however not necessary for all countries to use the same data collection 
systems, which can be customized to suit their own needs. For details, see 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/cpis/2002/  
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observed by foreign bond portfolio investors are related to the lower cost of debt for the host 
market.  
We test our research question using sovereign debt yield spread as a measure of cost 
of debt, and using the standard measure of foreign bias. The results show that a higher degree 
of foreign bias, i.e. preference to over-allocate relative to the implied benchmark, has 
significant implications for the yield spreads of sovereign bonds. Specifically, we find that 
costs of debt across countries are strongly and negatively related to foreign bias. The 
statistical and economic significance of our results hold even after a number of robustness 
checks.  
The results of our study hold important policy implications, particularly for the capital 
constrained emerging markets. The negative association between spread and foreign bias 
suggests that policymakers should strive to reduce barriers to inward foreign portfolio 
investments which would allow foreign investors to optimally hold the host country’s share 
of allocation in their portfolios. This should help reduce the cost of sovereign debt and that of 
tradable corporate bonds. Given that the current global bond outstanding stands roughly at 
USD 100 trillion, reduction of bond spread by even a few bps has the potential to translate 
into significant savings and encourage capital investments. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Country 
I 
SPRD (bps) 
II 
AFBIAS 
III 
LIFE 
IV 
ER (0-50) 
V 
FR (0-50) 
VI 
PR (0-100) 
Argentina 1764.71 0.34 18.9 36.68 34.62 65.60 
Azerbaijan 283.95 1.76 6.3 37.29 48.18 60.90 
Belarus 844.96 2.15 3.8 30.28 29.96 55.25 
Bolivia 293.89 1.67 9.1 39.51 45.82 58.02 
Brazil 372.93 -0.26 14.0 36.23 36.76 66.86 
Bulgaria 187.15 1.74 5.8 34.37 35.11 68.94 
Chile 134.63 0.06 9.3 40.15 38.80 77.88 
China 118.96 -3.76 6.8 40.02 47.03 65.36 
Colombia 274.61 1.16 11.8 35.51 38.15 58.48 
Costa Rica 337.40 2.56 13.0 35.14 39.93 72.02 
Croatia 211.67 -0.29 5.1 34.70 34.44 73.67 
Dominican Republic 542.33 3.07 7.4 34.94 36.89 65.44 
Ecuador 963.07 1.77 12.2 35.55 37.62 55.40 
Egypt 263.91 1.38 7.3 31.61 40.55 57.71 
El Salvador 341.37 2.14 17.0 34.23 37.07 66.64 
Gabon 410.63 1.47 7.5 44.01 44.30 58.90 
Georgia 551.53 1.23 6.2 n/a n/a n/a 
Ghana 560.43 3.45 7.1 30.53 36.38 65.74 
Guatemala 261.03 2.24 10.7 34.72 39.00 60.44 
Hungary 209.06 0.17 7.1 34.55 33.08 77.20 
India 223.78 -1.20 6.3 33.04 40.47 59.14 
Indonesia 282.09 1.15 13.4 36.78 38.76 58.04 
Iraq 549.08 2.58 13.5 34.17 40.72 39.26 
Ivory Coast 1948.73 2.03 10.1 35.97 38.60 48.56 
Jamaica 593.91 1.29 20.1 27.78 33.44 72.07 
Kazakhstan 419.42 3.07 8.2 37.40 34.50 69.79 
Latvia 154.70 1.85 5.3 37.95 25.32 71.69 
Lebanon 416.19 -1.13 5.4 28.98 30.96 56.73 
Lithuania 241.96 2.10 6.5 33.81 33.50 72.14 
Malaysia 139.56 -0.23 7.4 40.55 42.60 73.64 
Mexico 204.71 0.88 14.5 36.59 39.92 70.38 
Morocco 146.81 1.89 4.1 34.91 40.55 69.80 
Namibia 259.98 2.17 8.3 33.27 36.30 75.26 
Nigeria 532.72 3.09 8.3 35.21 43.86 43.89 
Pakistan 612.49 -1.66 4.9 32.57 38.09 46.72 
Paraguay 252.13 1.74 12.5 36.02 41.46 58.04 
Peru 250.74 1.81 15.0 38.40 40.90 63.02 
Philippines 280.44 1.00 12.5 37.50 40.00 62.62 
Poland 129.11 -0.47 7.2 36.70 36.38 77.05 
Romania 265.07 2.11 10.2 35.53 34.85 65.28 
Russia 251.22 1.28 9.3 39.61 43.93 63.35 
Slovakia 111.50 -2.38 8.0 39.56 35.52 73.91 
South Africa 194.62 -0.15 7.9 35.02 38.33 67.22 
Sri Lanka 558.61 2.03 5.4 32.80 36.75 55.91 
Trinidad and Tobago 210.67 1.39 5.8 39.18 46.08 69.38 
Turkey 333.08 0.79 11.9 32.69 32.57 60.12 
Ukraine 654.73 2.37 4.9 32.98 35.88 63.76 
Uruguay 377.21 2.28 18.3 35.92 33.85 71.86 
Venezuela 880.68 2.25 13.4 32.71 41.61 48.60 
Vietnam 301.53 1.51 6.9 32.92 39.57 64.91 
 Average  445.63 1.06 9.8 35.33 38.02 63.96 
Note: This table presents quarterly averages from (3rd quarter of 2002 to 4th quarter of 2014) of key variables for host 
country j. SPRD is the measure of sovereign bond spreads obtained from JP Morgan’s EMBI Global. Average foreign bias 
(AFBIAS) reflects the deviation of country j’s share in bond holdings for emerging-market-focused mutual funds i (wi j, i ≠ 
j) from the world bond market capitalization weight of country j (w* j). AFBIAS is calculated as the natural log of (wi j / w* 
j). LIFE is the average years remaining to maturity for constituent bonds. Economic Risk (ER) is the sum of five ICRG 
components reflecting various economic risks; similarly, Financial Risk (FR) is the sum of five components reflecting 
various financial risks of country j; and Political Risk (PR) is the sum of 12 components reflecting various political risks. 
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Table 2: Correlation of Key Variables 
 
(784 observations)     
 SPRD (EMBI Plus) SPRD (EMBI Global) AFBIAS LIFE ER FR PR 
SPRD (EMBI Plus) 1       
SPRD (EMBI Global) 0.997* 1      
AFBIAS -0.056* -0.061* 1     
LIFE 0.061 0.063 -0.067 1    
ER -0.252* -0.254* -0.050 0.253* 1   
FR -0.405* -0.408* 0.178* 0.063 0.433* 1  
PR -0.282* -0.269* -0.351* -0.109* 0.274* -0.136* 1 
        
Note: This table presents correlation matrix of the key variables used in this study. SPRD is the measure of sovereign bond spreads obtained from JP Morgan’s EMBI Plus and EMBI Global.  
Average foreign bias (AFBIAS) reflects the deviation of country j’s share in bond holdings for emerging-market-focused mutual funds i (wi j, i ≠ j) from the world bond market capitalization 
weight of country j (w* j). AFBIAS is calculated as the natural log of (wi j / w* j). LIFE is the average years remaining to maturity for constituent bonds in the EMBI Index for country j. 
Economic Risk (ER) is the sum of five components from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) reflecting various economic risks of country j, namely, i) GDP per capita, ii) real GDP 
growth, iii) annual inflation, iv) budget balance to GDP ratio, and v) current account to GDP ratio; Financial Risk (FR) is the sum of five components from ICRG reflecting various financial 
risks of country j, namely i) foreign debt to GDP, ii) foreign debt service to exports, iii) current account to exports, iv) international reserve as months of import cover, and v) exchange rate 
stability; and Political Risk (PR) is the sum of 12 components from ICRG reflecting various political risks of country j, namely i) government stability, ii) socioeconomic conditions, iii) 
investment profile, iv) internal conflict, v) external conflict, vi) corruption, vii) military in politics, viii) religious tensions, ix) law and order, x) ethnic tensions, xi) democratic accountability, 
and xii) bureaucracy quality. Statistical significance, at the minimum conventional level of 5% is denoted by an asterisk (*). 
  
  
33 
 
Table 3: Regression of Sovereign Bond Spread on Foreign Bias 
 I II III IV V VI 
AFBIAS -83.352*** -77.461*** -85.320*** -65.825*** -67.796*** -64.547*** 
 (-3.12) (-3.21) (-3.29) (-3.45) (-3.52) (-3.14) 
       
LIFE  -46.888 -40.813 -26.472 -25.334 -78.032 
  (-0.84) (-0.70) (-0.48) (-0.47) (-1.14) 
       
GBL   337.913*** 294.024*** 280.818***  
   (5.43) (7.21) (6.69)  
       
EFRisk    793.520*** 785.015*** 671.309*** 
    (5.17) (4.86) (4.43) 
       
PRisk     186.167** 354.902*** 
     (2.21) (5.54) 
       
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Time Fixed Effects      YES 
       
Constant 536.222*** 631.421*** 648.664*** 646.499*** 548.909*** 171.634 
 (9.25) (5.03) (3.14) (3.05) (3.44) (0.97) 
Adjusted R-square 0.448 0.449 0.497 0.510 0.512 0.544 
Number of observations 1737 1736 1736 1678 1678 1644 
Note: This table shows regression results in which the dependent variable is sovereign bond spread (SPRD) for country j. The key independent variable is average foreign bias (AFBIAS) which 
reflects the deviation of country j’s share in bond holdings for emerging-market-focused mutual funds i (i ≠ j) (wi j) from the world bond market capitalization weight of country j (w* j). AFBIAS is 
calculated as the natural log of (wi j / w* j). Control variables include: i) bond-specific time remaining to maturity in years expressed in natural log form (LIFE); ii) global macroeconomic variable 
taken as the difference between Barclays Corporate High Yield and Barclays US Treasury, expressed in natural log form (GBL); iii) economic and financial risk of country j expressed as the natural 
log of (100 – ER – FR) less the comparable figure of USA (EFRisk); and iv) political risk of country j expressed as the natural log of (100 – PR) less the comparable figure of USA (PRisk). ER is the 
raw score from ICRG representing Economic Risk; FR is the raw score from ICRG reflecting financial risk; and PR is the raw score from ICRG reflecting political risk of country j. Data are 
quarterly and are from 3rd quarter of 2002 to 4th quarter of 2014. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and spatial dependence using the 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) approach. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in brackets. 
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Table 4: Regression of Sovereign Bond Spread on Lagged Value of Foreign Bias 
 I II III IV V VI 
AFBIAS (lag 1) -84.602*** -78.251** -81.416*** -61.472*** -63.560*** -66.193*** 
 (-2.70) (-2.61) (-2.95) (-2.78) (-2.83) (-2.88) 
       
LIFE  -51.721 -45.684 -29.217 -27.444 -44.956 
  (-0.87) (-0.75) (-0.49) (-0.47) (-0.76) 
       
GBL   342.361*** 293.297*** 279.637***  
   (5.34) (7.06) (6.58)  
       
EFRisk    802.772*** 795.210*** 683.409*** 
    (4.89) (4.61) (4.20) 
       
PRisk     188.627** 359.100*** 
     (2.14) (5.47) 
       
Country Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Time Fixed Effects      YES 
       
Constant 539.516*** 644.601*** 516.755*** 186.283*** 221.409*** 132.582 
 (8.91) (4.79) (3.44) (3.38) (3.48) (1.03) 
Adjusted R-square  0.453  0.454 0.503 0.513 0.515 0.548 
Number of observations 1693 1692 1692 1635 1635 1603 
Note: This table shows the regression results in which the dependent variable is sovereign bond spread (SPRD) for country j. The key independent variable is the lagged value of average foreign 
bias (AFBIAS) which reflects the deviation of country j’s share in bond holdings for emerging-market-focused mutual funds i (i ≠ j) (w i j) from the world bond market capitalization weight of 
country j (w* j). AFBIAS is calculated as the natural log of (wi j / w* j). Control variables include: i) bond-specific time remaining to maturity in years expressed in natural log form (LIFE); ii) 
global macroeconomic variable taken as the difference between Barclays Corporate High Yield and Barclays US Treasury, expressed in natural log form (GBL); iii) economic and financial risk 
of country j expressed as the natural log of (100 – ER – FR) less the comparable figure of USA (EFRisk); and iv) political risk of country j expressed as the natural log of (100 – PR) less the 
comparable figure of USA (PRisk). ER is the raw score from ICRG representing Economic Risk; FR is the raw score from ICRG reflecting financial risk; and PR is the raw score from ICRG 
reflecting political risk of country j. Data are quarterly and are from 3rd quarter of 2002 to 4th quarter of 2014. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity, 
autocorrelation, and spatial dependence using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) approach. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics 
are shown in brackets.  
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Table 5: Vector Autoregression of Sovereign Spread and Foreign Bias  
 I 
SPRD 
II 
SPRD 
III 
AFBIAS 
IV 
AFBIAS 
SPRD (lag 1) 0.836*** 0.849*** 0.000 0.000 
 (10.92) (11.75) (1.04) (0.44) 
     
AFBIAS( lag 1) -27.746** -19.775* 0.876*** 0.870*** 
 (-2.39) (-1.90) (39.60) (39.36) 
     
LIFE -23.821 -16.327 0.086** 0.085** 
 (-0.92) (-0.69) (2.26) (2.10) 
     
GBL 199.731***  0.024  
 (3.06)  (0.97)  
     
EFRisk 173.439** 137.078** -0.112** -0.115** 
 (2.12) (2.28) (-2.30) (-2.09) 
     
PRisk 108.190* 125.321* -0.025 0.005 
 (1.72) (1.89) (-0.41) (0.04) 
     
Country Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
     
Time Fixed Effects  YES  YES 
     
Constant 526.279** 775.305*** 0.224 0.473 
 (2.08) (3.18) (1.09) (1.69) 
Adjusted R-square 0.825 0.862 0.935 0.953 
Number of observations 1635 1603 1613 1592 
This table presents the results of the Vector Auto Regression (VAR) model to model country j’s sovereign spread (SPRD) and average foreign bias (AFBIAS) as endogenously determined 
dependent variables. AFBIAS reflects the deviation of country j’s share in bond holdings for emerging-market-focused mutual funds i (i ≠ j) (w i j) from the world bond market capitalization 
weight of country j (w* j). AFBIAS is calculated as the natural log of (wi j / w* j). Exogenous variables include: i) bond-specific time remaining to maturity in years expressed in natural log form 
(LIFE); ii) global macroeconomic variable taken as the difference between Barclays Corporate High Yield and Barclays US Treasury, expressed in natural  log form (GBL); iii) economic and 
financial risk of country j expressed as the natural log of (100 – ER – FR) less the comparable figure of USA (EFRisk); and iv) political risk of country j expressed as the natural log of (100 – 
PR) less the comparable figure of USA (PRisk). ER is the raw score from ICRG representing Economic Risk; FR is the raw score from ICRG reflecting financial risk; and PR is the raw score 
from ICRG reflecting political risk of country j. Data are quarterly and are from 3rd quarter of 2002 to 4th quarter of 2014. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and spatial dependence using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) approach. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance 
levels. t-statistics are shown in brackets. 
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Table 6: Two-Stage Least Squares Regression of Sovereign Bond Spread on Foreign Bias  
 I 
1st stage 
II 
2nd stage 
Familiarity 0.134***  
 (3.34)  
   
AFBIAS  -94.706*** 
  (-4.82) 
   
LIFE 0.591 359.152*** 
 (1.37) (5.49) 
   
EFRisk 0.234 1010.092*** 
 (1.47) (5.82) 
   
PRisk 0.083 376.261*** 
 (0.41) (3.92) 
   
Country Fixed Effects YES YES 
   
Time Fixed Effects YES YES 
   
Constant -0.811 129.755*** 
 (-1.17) (5.91) 
Adjusted R-square 0.837 0.513 
Number of observations 1412 1412 
Note: This table presents results from two-stage least square (2SLS) regression. The dependent variable is sovereign bond 
spread (SPRD) for country j. The key independent variable is average foreign bias (AFBIAS) which reflects the deviation of 
country j’s share in bond holdings for emerging-market-focused mutual funds i (i ≠ j) (w i j) from the world bond market 
capitalization weight of country j (w* j). AFBIAS is calculated as the natural log of (wi j / w* j). AFBIAS is instrumented by 
familiarity level (Familiarity) with country j which is taken as the first principal component of country j’s mobile usage per 
100, telephone usage per 100, and broadband usage per 100. Control variables include: i) bond-specific time remaining to 
maturity in years expressed in natural log form (LIFE); ii) global macroeconomic variable taken as the difference between 
Barclays Corporate High Yield and Barclays US Treasury, expressed in natural log form (GBL); iii) economic and financial 
risk of country j expressed as the natural log of (100 – ER – FR) less the comparable figure of USA (EFRisk); and iv) 
political risk of country j expressed as the natural log of (100 – PR) less the comparable figure of USA (PRisk). ER is the 
raw score from ICRG representing Economic Risk; FR is the raw score from ICRG reflecting financial risk; and PR is the 
raw score from ICRG reflecting political risk of country j. Data are quarterly and are from 3rd quarter of 2002 to 4th quarter 
of 2014. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and spatial 
dependence using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) approach. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 
1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in brackets. 
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Table 7: Regression of Sovereign Bond Spread on Foreign Bias for EMU countries 
 I II III IV V VI 
AFBIAS -493.923*** -505.102*** -499.496*** -408.311*** -418.409*** -378.2** 
 (-3.86) (-3.95) (-4.01) (-3.85) (-3.54) (-3.22) 
       
LIFE  427.621 402.838 118.508 118.635 170.3 
  (0.85) (0.78) (0.20) (0.21) (0.25) 
       
GBL   42.661 18.115 19.678  
   (1.43) (0.87) (0.91)  
       
EFRisk    348.822*** 370.217** 188.10** 
    (3.89) (3.25) (2.59) 
       
PRisk     -53.425 -30.70 
     (-0.53) (-0.28) 
       
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Time Fixed Effects      YES 
       
Constant -43.083 -519.721 -542.223 -295.310 -303.605 -248.38 
 (-1.57) (-1.00) (-1.05) (-0.51) (-0.54) (-0.42) 
Adjusted R-square 0.424 0.428 0.430 0.486 0.487 0.526 
Number of observations 127 127 127 127 127 127 
Note: This table shows the regression results in which the dependent variable is 10-year sovereign bond spread (SPRD_EMU) for Eurozone country j against that of Germany. The key 
independent variable is average foreign bias (AFBIAS) which reflects the deviation of country j’s share in the bond holdings of source countries i (i ≠ j) (wi j) from the world bond market 
capitalization weight of country j (w* j). AFBIAS is calculated as the natural log of (wi j / w* j). Control variables include: i) bond-specific time remaining to maturity in years expressed in 
natural log form (LIFE); ii) global macroeconomic variable taken as the difference between Barclays Corporate High Yield and Barclays US Treasury, expressed in natural log form (GBL); iii) 
economic and financial risk of country j expressed as the natural log of (100 – ER – FR) less the comparable figure of Germany (EFRisk); and iv) political risk of country j expressed as the 
natural log of (100 – PR) less the comparable figure of Germany (PRisk). ER is the raw score from ICRG representing Economic Risk; FR is the raw score from ICRG reflecting financial risk; 
and PR is the raw score from ICRG reflecting political risk of country j. Data are yearly and are from 2001 to 2013. Countries include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain with GIIPS countries in bold. All models report results with the standard errors corrected using Newey and West (1987) approach. Statistical significance is 
reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in brackets. 
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Table 8: Regression of Sovereign Bond Spread on Foreign Bias for EMU countries – Difference-in-Difference 
 I II III 
Giips * Post 429.932*** 440.478*** 433.379*** 
 (3.72) (3.78) (3.51) 
    
Post 46.714*** -31.842 -133.984 
 (5.77) (-1.08) (-1.39) 
    
LIFE  -592.804 -237.621 
  (-0.92) (-0.36) 
    
GBL  28.114  
  (0.34)  
    
EFRisk  319.667** 177.339 
  (2.40) (1.22) 
    
PRisk  -83.883 -26.691 
  (-0.92) (-0.31) 
    
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
    
Time Fixed Effects   YES 
    
Constant 14.402** 351.193 -2.764 
 (2.36) (0.95) (-0.50) 
Adjusted R-square 0.464 0.493 0.534 
Number of observations 127 127 127 
Note: This table shows the regression results in which the dependent variable is 10-year sovereign bond spread (SPRD_EMU) for Eurozone country j against that of Germany. Variables of 
interest include Giips*Post which is a multiplicative term of Giips and Post. Giips is a dummy of 1 for five GIIPS countries, otherwise 0. Post is a dummy equal to 1 if time period ≥ 2009 Q1, 
otherwise 0. Control variables include: i) bond-specific time remaining to maturity in years expressed in natural log form (LIFE); ii) global macroeconomic variable taken as the difference 
between Barclays Corporate High Yield and Barclays US Treasury, expressed in natural log form (GBL); iii) economic and financial risk of country j expressed as the natural log of (100 – ER – 
FR) less the comparable figure of Germany (EFRisk); and iv) political risk of country j expressed as the natural log of (100 – PR) less the comparable figure of Germany (PRisk). ER is the raw 
score from ICRG representing Economic Risk; FR is the raw score from ICRG reflecting financial risk; and PR is the raw score from ICRG reflecting political risk of country j.  Data are yearly 
and are from 2001 to 2013. Countries include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain with GIIPS countries in bold. All models report 
results with the standard errors corrected using Newey-West (1997) approach. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are 
shown in brackets. 
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Table 9: Regression of Sovereign Bond Spread on Foreign Bias – Alternative Data Source for Economic and Political Risk 
 I II III IV 
AFBIAS -103.576*** -88.761*** -94.632*** -91.677*** 
 (-4.14) (-3.53) (-3.40) (-3.54) 
     
LIFE -126.873 -145.309 -151.748 -165.454 
 (-1.20) (-1.55) (-1.72) (-1.42) 
     
GBL 354.294*** 342.811***   
 (5.78) (7.03)   
     
GDPph 24.396** 22.702** 20.588** 7.918 
 (2.27) (2.28) (2.21) (1.18) 
     
Gov Indx  234.140*** 199.104*** 93.341*** 
  (6.30) (6.32) (5.29) 
     
EFRisk    722.936*** 
    (2.89) 
     
PRisk    310.101** 
    (2.59) 
     
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
     
Time Fixed Effects   YES YES 
     
Constant -377.521*** -374.266*** -369.778 118.654 
 (-2.82) (-5.86) (-1.12) (0.44) 
Adjusted R-square 0.450 0.492 0.517 0.556 
Number of observations 1128 1128 1100 1100 
Note: This table shows regression results in which the dependent variable is sovereign bond spread (SPRD) for country j. The key independent variable is average foreign bias (AFBIAS) which 
reflects the deviation of country j’s share in bond holdings for emerging-market-focused mutual funds i (i ≠ j) (w i j) from the world bond market capitalization weight of country j (w* j). AFBIAS is 
calculated as the natural log of (wi j / w* j). Control variables include: i) bond-specific time remaining to maturity in years expressed in natural log form (LIFE); ii) global macroeconomic variable 
taken as the difference between Barclays Corporate High Yield and Barclays US Treasury, expressed in natural log form (GBL); iii) GDP growth rate per capita (annual %) constructed by subtracting 
the figure for a country from that of US (GDPph); iv) governance index from World Bank Governance Indicators taken as a sum of six different risks and subtracted from that of USA (Gov Indx);  v) 
economic and financial risk of country j expressed as the natural log of (100 – ER – FR) less the comparable figure of USA (EFRisk); and vi) political risk of country j expressed as the natural log of 
(100 – PR) less the comparable figure of USA (PRisk). ER is the raw score from ICRG representing Economic Risk; FR is the raw score from ICRG reflecting financial risk; and PR is the raw score 
from ICRG reflecting political risk of country j. Data are quarterly (except for GDPph and Gov Indx which are yearly) and are from 3rd quarter of 2002 to 4th quarter of 2014. All models report 
results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and spatial dependence using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) approach. Statistical significance is reported against 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in brackets. 
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Figure 1: Long Term Sovereign Bond Spread of GIIPS and Non-GIIPS Countries 
                  
Note: This figure shows the trend in the soverign spread (over German sovereign bonds) for the GIIPS and non-
GIIPS EMU countries. Time 2009 Q1 corresponds to the quarter prior to the start of the Eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis. Source: Authors’ calculation. Raw data obtained from Thompson Reuters. 
 
 
Figure 2: Foreign Bias of GIIPS and Non-GIIPS Countries 
     
Note: This figure shows the AFBIAS for GIIPS and non-GIIPS countries over time. Time 2009 Q1 corresponds to 
the quarter prior to the start of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. AFBIAS measures other than of year ends are 
calculated using interpolated (linear) CPIS data. Source: Authors’ calculations. Raw data obtained from BIS and 
CPIS.
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Appendix A: SPRD (from EMBIG) Over Different Time Periods 
Country 
2002-2006  
Normal economic 
period 
2007-2008  
Global financial crisis 
2009 - 2011  
Eurozone sovereign debt  
crisis period 
2012-2014  
Post sovereign debt crisis 
period 
Argentina 3,432.7 648.6 842.6 928.9 
Azerbaijan 
   
284.0 
Belarus 
  
994.1 770.4 
Bolivia 
   
293.9 
Brazil 629.6 248.9 231.3 212.2 
Bulgaria 152.6 222.5 287.9 114.6 
Chile 98.7 170.1 149.6 149.8 
China 63.7 128.1 143.6 171.1 
Colombia 401.7 241.6 221.4 159.2 
Costa Rica 
   
337.4 
Croatia 115.8 111.1 284.7 349.4 
Dominican 
Republic 666.8 513.4 524.9 392.3 
Ecuador 925.9 1,197.7 1,153.8 671.6 
Egypt 151.3 195.1 264.9 477.7 
El Salvador 271.7 309.6 397.5 411.0 
Gabon 
 
572.3 446.7 307.2 
Georgia 
 
1,009.5 610.2 378.4 
Ghana 
 
664.7 561.1 516.3 
Guatemala 
   
261.0 
Hungary 50.3 159.1 345.3 344.3 
India 
   
223.8 
Indonesia 252.4 348.6 295.0 252.1 
Iraq 494.6 651.3 517.4 526.3 
Ivory Coast 2,940.1 2,447.8 1,566.1 511.7 
Jamaica 
 
589.9 595.5 594.0 
Kazakhstan 
 
550.6 470.0 292.3 
Latvia 
   
154.7 
Lebanon 424.4 511.3 364.8 392.0 
Lithuania 
  
319.1 184.1 
Malaysia 115.7 154.5 168.9 136.1 
Mexico 204.7 203.1 223.3 187.2 
Morocco 189.5 72.4 72.4 206.9 
Namibia 
  
337.0 253.6 
Nigeria 736.7 16.4 402.3 330.2 
Pakistan 262.1 784.5 879.0 756.9 
Paraguay 
   
252.1 
Peru 344.7 225.2 217.2 160.4 
Philippines 396.3 269.8 242.0 152.1 
Poland 62.3 119.9 198.3 138.4 
Romania 
   
265.1 
Russia 174.3 262.0 303.9 268.2 
Slovakia 
   
111.5 
South Africa 143.2 233.5 216.3 224.2 
Sri Lanka 
 
983.4 554.7 385.5 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
   
210.7 
Turkey 425.2 315.3 283.3 256.6 
Ukraine 309.4 665.4 893.8 926.6 
Uruguay 602.4 316.3 273.7 183.6 
Venezuela 592.7 698.0 1,174.9 1,140.2 
Vietnam 152.7 298.8 373.9 293.0 
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Cost of sovereign debt and foreign bias in bond allocations  
 
Highlights 
 Higher foreign bias in bond allocations, relative to the benchmark, should enhance 
international risk sharing.  
 Cost of debt in markets with higher foreign bias should be lower.  
 Results show higher level of foreign bias is negatively related to cost of debt.  
 Cost of debt could be lowered by encouraging theoretically optimal foreign 
allocations. 
 
